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Introduction 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a regional organization that has 
witnessed significant developments since its establishment in 1967; such as the introduction 
of the Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992 and the accession of Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and 
Vietnam (MCLV) as members in the last decade of the 20th century (MacGillivray & 
Carpenter, 2013, pp.5-6). The formation of a fully functioning ASEAN Community by 2025 
is the most comprehensive plan yet and consists of three pillars, namely the Socio-Cultural, 
Political-Security, and Economic Communities (ASEAN Vision 2020, 1997). This immense 
project reflects ASEAN’s ambition to advance to the next stage of regional integration, which 
is comparatively deeper and wider in scope than previous stages. The application of regional 
integration theories should deliver meaningful scientific insights about this particular process.
 Since two general regional integration theories, neofunctionalism and liberal 
intergovernmentalism are based upon (assumed) generally applicable aspects, like the 
consolidation of integration due to the congregation of common interests of rational actors, 
they should be able to explain and predict the course of the ASEAN integration process (Kim, 
2014, pp.391-392). However, there appeared many unexpected integration-impeding elements 
during the integration process that were not suggested by the theories, such as implementation 
postponements, which stalled the integration process and questioned one of their most 
important scientific features of the theories, namely the general applicability.  
 Hence, this research investigates these interesting theoretical contradictions and strives 
to seek explanations to get a better understanding of the applicability of the theories to the 
case of ASEAN-integration. Due to the emphasis on developing the economic dimension of 
the ASEAN Community in both the scientific literature and in the outlines of the ASEAN 
documents, this study specifies on this particular sphere. Therefore, the research question is 
formulated as follows: “What explains the slow progress in the further regional integration 
process towards an ASEAN Economic Community?”     
 This question is very important in many respects. Firstly, Southeast Asia is a globally 
significant region. The founding members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand) witnessed great economic rises since the establishment of ASEAN, reflected by the 
increase in gross domestic products (total value of domestically produced goods/services per 
annum, GDP) (Mya Than, 2001, pp.205-206). The area is also significant from demographic 
and cultural perspectives. Almost ten percent of the world population lives in this region. It 
includes the nations with the largest Islamic population and the highest Buddhist-population 
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proportions (Pew Research Center, 2014). With these characteristics in mind, it is of great 
importance to analyze the developments of the integration process, as it can potentially affect 
a big share of the global economy and the world population (Hew, 2005, p.17).   
 Theoretically, this question is also important. The selected theoretical models are 
considered as the most acclaimed and pertinent theories within the research area of regional 
integration (Kim, 2014, pp.374-375). These paradigms have been used for a long time as 
analytical tools in a wide range of cases due to its general applicability. As the general 
applicability has its flaws, it is necessary to examine these potential undiscovered gaps or 
inconsistencies to stimulate the academic debate on how to make the theoretical notions 
continuously relevant to universally utilize.        
 The research question also relates to the current trend of greater regionalism in the 
world (Baldwin, 2011, pp.8-10). ASEAN is one of the many regional institutions that have 
been strengthened in the 21st century. States recognize the constantly altering mechanics of 
the interdependent global economy and try to create corresponding mutually benefitting 
arrangements. The creation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) fits into this 
direction as well what further triggers the need to analyze its integration process, as it could 
lead to important insights to the greater scope on how to comprehend the global trend of 
regionalism.           
 Moreover, the attributes of the ASEAN integration developments are relevant for the 
European Union’s (EU) integration crises. Since its inception, ASEAN has gradually 
expanded its scope of influence without any severe threats to its organizational existence 
(Capannelli & Filippini, 2010, pp.182-183). The participating members never have threatened 
to withdraw from the organization and take flexible stances, even when impediments 
appeared. Hence, the implications of this research could act as meaningful reference for the 
European case of integration. In total, this thesis is targeted at a wide, multidisciplinary 
audience.   
Structure  
This thesis is structured as follows: In the first segment, the theoretical framework will be 
outlined. The key elements of neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism shall be 
described in order to facilitate evaluation. The forthcoming part include a historic overview of 
the ASEAN integration developments. The existing academic contribution on the theoretical 
applicability for the case of ASEAN is going to be addressed in the research context. 
Subsequently, the methodology comprises the next section. This component clarifies the 
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selection of the research design, data collection method and the data sources. The following 
three sections are part of the analytical sector of the research. It is divided in three categories 
to further structure the explanations: economic, institutional and strategic. After this 
substantive sector, a conclusion with the implications and limitations of the study will be 
presented to finalize the thesis. Main conclusion is that ASEAN’s distinct characteristics act 
as the main explanation to the theoretical applicability.  
Theoretical framework  
Neofunctionalism is the oldest (developed during the 1950s) and most prominent of the two 
regional integration theories (Risse, 2005, p.292). The building blocks lie in the theory of 
functionalism, which focused on the consolidation of international cooperation based upon the 
common interests of state and non-state actors (interest groups, social movements and 
corporations) and the leading role of technocrats (Haas, 1958, pp.139-140). Ernst Haas looked 
into Mitrany’s academic conceptions of Functionalism and tested the theory on the case of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). He modified certain essential elements, like 
the exchange of a technocratic vision for a politically feasible one (Schmitter, 2005, p.256). 
Haas stressed the positive, mutual implications (security, economic, and political) of 
international cooperation and highlighted the role of interest groups and social movements in 
pluralistic democracies to stimulate the process (Haas, 1958, p.141). This theory predicts an 
influential role for non-state actors in the course of the integration progress, because they 
could exert pressure on the national governments to engage in more regional integration 
arrangements. If non-state actors perceive larger benefits than costs from regional integration 
then they try to realize more extensive arrangements what simultaneously set the speed of this 
conflicting, incremental and self-reinforcing progress. In the context of ASEAN, the 
stimulating role should be fulfilled by the small and middle-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Chia, 
2013, pp. 23-25). These privately-owned, local businesses are labelled by the first Blueprint 
(roadmap with tasks and objectives) as the drivers of the equal regional economic 
development and get special attention by ASEAN to improve their economic participation. By 
increasing their share in the regional economy, they should be able to limit the importance of 
the state-owned and foreign enterprises and increasingly gain leverage to push the central 
governments.           
 The central concept of spill-over symbolizes the persistency in which the integration 
process operates (Schmitter, 2005, p.257). In practice, the spill-over-principle follows the 
pattern of a transformation from basic economic collaboration (functional spill-over) into 
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extensive political integration (political spill-over) (Rosamond, 2000, pp.60-61). ASEAN 
integration followed similar patterns in the past and should be capable to maintain it if gradual 
steps are taken.           
 Furthermore, the theory assumes that a regional organization will eventually pass 
through all stages of integration (Rosamond, 2000, pp.61-62). This includes the likes of 
gaining more authoritative powers from the member states and the emergence of a 
supranational organization. It means that the formation of the AEC acts as an intermediate 
step that will be followed up by an economic or political union. Eventually, the organization 
takes over the leading role from national governments and non-state actors and set the rate of 
integration. This latter element is regarded as the cultivated spill-over.  
                                     Table 1: Assumptions & predictions neofunctionalism 
 
The alternative theoretical explanation, liberal intergovernmentalism, is based upon a 
combination of the theories of rationalism, liberalism and intergovernmental institutionalism 
(Moravcsik, 1993, pp.480-481). The theory is characterized by the predominant role of 
national states and their subsequent bargaining. Non-state actors do not have decisive 
influence on the outcomes of the negotiations due to their distinct differences and lacking 
organizational structures (Andersson, 2015, pp.40-41). The liberal intergovernmentalist theory 
was developed during the 1990s as a framework to correctly explain the various events of the 
European integration process, which were not predicted as suggested by existing integration 
literature.           
 The consolidation of regional integration is based on a theoretical model, which is 
Element Assumption Prediction for ASEAN 
Main actors                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         Non-state actors (corporations, 
social movements and interest 
groups) 
Bigger share for SMEs
Driving mechanism Spill-overs (functional, political 
and cultivated)   
Spill-overs in the three ASEAN 
Community dimensions 
Governance scope Evolution to supranational  
organization 
Progression towards further 
stages of integration 
Method Incremental, conflicting inter-
actor negotiations 
Inter-actor negotiations (SMEs 
and MNCs vs states) 
Goals Welfare maximization  Economic integration 
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divided into three stages: national preferences, interstate bargaining, and the institutional 
decision-making (Moravcsik, 1993, pp.483-486). There is a clear distinction set between the 
two-level playing fields (domestic and international). The first stage acts as a domestic 
preparation for the forthcoming interstate discussions. On the national level, the relevant non-
state and state actors discuss the various consequences of integration and try to determine a 
collective, national preference in which the central government has a decisive role 
(Andersson, 2015, p.41). In the context of ASEAN, it means that the political elites and 
relevant stakeholders explore ways to maximize the collective interests. In the international 
stage, there are negotiations between the representatives of the member states about the 
concerned issues. These states have asymmetric bargaining positions depending on defining 
factors like the economy (Rattanasevee, 2014, p.117). It suggests that regional powerhouses, 
like Indonesia should have superior advantage above the others during the talks. These unfair 
positions should be reflected in the outcomes of the negotiations and in the forthcoming, 
institutional design (powers, policy scope, and legal framework). Based on these elements, the 
national governments should maintain its dominating voice during the developments towards 
the AEC with minor interference from  domestic non-state or extra-regional actors.   
 The obtainment of greater gains acts as the driving motive behind the integration 
efforts of the governments (Cockerham, 2010, p.166). States pursue arrangements in areas in 
which they conceive integration will lead to more beneficial outcomes than individualistic 
behavior. In times of ever-growing globalization, the level of interdependence is regarded as a 
considerable factor during the calculus of ASEAN integration. More integration signifies a 
deepening and widening of the transnational economic networks, which could provide many 
economic advantages in the contemporary world. On the basis of the calculation between the 
potential costs (losing sovereign powers) and benefits (global integration), states decide 
whether or not they engage in regional integration (Cockerham, 2010, pp.168-169). This 
weighing of interests fits in the concept of ‘rational state behavior’ where states base their 
actions on rational grounds. The supranational organization only acts as a tool to bind the 
respective member states with international agreements and does not get the powers to control 
the integration process (Sweet & Sandholtz, 1997, p.301). In relation to ASEAN, member 
states have already acknowledged the many positive consequences of integration viewing the 
comprehensive AEC-plans and their desire to integrate. The high degree of mutual benefits 
should drive the members to an as planned AEC-integration. However, this theory could not 
forecast the integration developments after the AEC, as it depends on the respective calculus 
if deeper integration is deemed necessary.   
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                                    Table 2: Assumptions & predictions liberal intergovernmentalism 
 
The two concerned theories have their own general predictions of the course of the integration 
process. Neofunctionalism emphasizes the driving role for SME’s during the procedure. Their 
influence will greatly determine the speed of passing all the integration phases. The other 
theory focuses more on the governments’ cost-benefit calculus of the collective interest as a 
determinant of the integration procedure. The larger the benefits, the more likely national 
governments stimulate the developments. Both the models have different explanatory 
features, but share the positive, timely AEC-integration as it increases the common welfare of 
a state and more specifically economic integration.      
 Viewing theoretical predictions in both tables, it becomes clear that there are major 
theoretical contradictions. Predicted elements, like driving roles for SME’s (neofunctionalism) 
or leadership roles (liberal intergovernmentalism) did not appear. Instead, there emerged 
unexpected points, like the problematic implementation of integration plans or the major 
influence of external actors. These points have, along with other issues, contributed to the 
unpredicted, slow integration process. It turns out that the existing theoretical material is 
unable to correctly predict the region’s integration process. These contradictions question the 
general applicability of the theories and affect their acclaimed scientific value. Therefore, this 
research takes up the important task to discover the explanations for the contradictions and 
aims to test the scientific relevancy of the theories. 
 
 
Element Assumption Prediction for ASEAN 
Main actors National governments ASEAN members 
Driving mechanism Congregation of interests based 
on the cost-benefit calculus 
Prioritization for collective, 
mutually beneficial ASEAN 
interests 
Governance scope Depending on rational cost-
benefit calculus 
Depending on rational cost-
benefit calculus 
Method Unequal inter-state negotiations          Leadership roles for powerful 
states 
Goals Welfare maximization  Economic integration 
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History of ASEAN integration 
The signing of the Bangkok Declaration signaled the formal starting point for the regional 
organization. As formulated in the Declaration, the main purposes of ASEAN were “to 
accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in an equal 
manner” (ASEAN Declaration, 1967). The ASEAN Way was informally launched in that 
same year, formed as a baseline in the style of operation and dictated the way member states 
should act. It was a collection of normative principles among which the non-interference in 
internal affairs and the mutual respect for the individual sovereignty were the most important 
ones (Katsumata, 2003, pp.106-107). The most influential negotiations in ASEAN take place 
at the higher political levels of the head of states (during summits) or at ministerial degrees (in 
the various councils) whereby arrangements are made via an informal and consensus-based 
decision-making process (Bridges, 2004, p.393). The preferential trade policy-agreement in 
1977 (lowering trade barriers for a selected number of products) presented the first step 
towards regional integration (Chia, 2011, pp.49-50).    
 During a summit in 1992, the heads of states agreed to start removing the intra-
regional tariffs for a larger list of products under the umbrella of an ASEAN-free trade area, 
which indicates the next stage of the regional integration process (Chia, 2011, pp.50-51). An 
essential component of the AFTA was the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) that 
set out the implementation targets per country. In addition, ASEAN witnessed an enlargement 
by four countries, together abbreviated as MCLV during the similar time frame and 
experienced the Financial Crisis in 1997. The latter event had a lot of impact on the respective 
economies (Chia, 2013, p.27).       
 Acknowledging the strength of the interdependency between ASEAN economies, the 
head of states intended to prevent such dramatic events again in the future by proposing an 
intensification of the regional integration efforts (Cockerham, 2010, p.175). As a result, the 
ASEAN Vision 2020, the document that outlined the original, long-term core objectives and 
tasks by 2020, described the plan to create a single market and production base 
(manufacturing center) in the form of an AEC (ASEAN Vision 2020, 1997). The other three 
components are respectively global integration, equitable development and competitive 
economic region. The integration step of a single market is characterized by the addition of 
the free flow of production factors in the region, such as products, services, capital, 
investments, and (skilled) labor (MacGillivray & Carpenter, 2013, pp.6-8). The original 
intention was to fully realize the agreed principles by 2020 and to a certain extent; ASEAN 
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members have made positive advancements to reach the integration ideals. As of 2015, the 
value of the intra-regional trade in goods has increased to $545 million and accounts to 24% 
of the total trade (ASEAN, Chartbook 2016, pp.13-15).    
 Despite an ambitious acceleration of the plans in 2007 to speed up the formal opening 
of the AEC to 2015, there occurred various problems during the transition process (Chia, 
2011, pp.61-62). There are particularly issues with the commitment of member states in 
realizing necessary domestic reforms (Pelkmans, 2016, pp.192-193). This integration phase 
differs to previous steps in terms of national engagement: For instance, materialization of a 
free movement of professional workers necessitates corresponding national immigration 
regulations. Therefore, this step requires a greater degree of member states' commitment in 
reforming laws than past integration steps. This type of problems form the majority of the 
impediments (Das, 2013, pp.6-7). This can be exemplified by looking at multiple sectors, like 
the lack of implementation of regional standards in the services sector. Another problem is the 
financial miscalculation (Chia, 2013, pp.33-35). Many projects require greater financial 
support than estimated by ASEAN due to the unique circumstances. Considering these issues, 
review experts Chia and Das are doubtful about the fulfillment of all of the intended plans of 
the AEC by 2025. 
Research context 
In relation to the theoretical framework, there are a number of academic scholars who are 
already trying to explain the developments towards an AEC with existing theories. Starting 
off, many academics noticed the distinct regional characteristics as an obstacle of the 
theoretical application to the case of ASEAN (Kim, 2014, p.376). Fundamental aspects, as the 
existence of a democracy and the freedom of association, are not always present in the 
political systems of the member states of ASEAN. In fact, there are no ‘fully democratic 
regimes’ in the region in 2015 (The Freedom House, 2016). This could lead to problematic 
interpretations.         
 Hence, the applicability of the two theories as analytical instruments can initially be 
challenging, but not impossible (Kim, 2014, pp.390-391). This can be showcased by the 
pertinent parts of the theoretical material in explaining the previous ASEAN-integration 
stages. Characteristics, as the gradual nature of creating arrangements (neofunctionalism) and 
the congregation of national interests (liberal intergovernmentalism) are illustrated by the 
steady evolution of integration plans, as tariff reductions in non-vital industries to 
comprehensive accords in economically more significant sectors (Hew, 2005, p.14). This 
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indicates the persistent value of the theoretical material to ASEAN and simultaneously signals 
a change in the mechanics of ASEAN-integration.      
 According to Capannelli & Filippini (2010, pp.181-183), the theories could also 
function as a theoretical base for learning lessons by noting the positive implications and 
overcoming the limitations of European integration, such as the significance of 
implementation tools. As the process is still ongoing, these learning lessons can be of great 
value when ASEAN member states timely assess the obstacles the Europeans faced in their 
respective integration history and implement measures to prevent similar situations. Jetschke 
and Rüland (2009, pp.185-186) emphasized the reactive stance of ASEAN in looking at the 
European integration, evidenced by strengthening the CEPT as a response to the as threat-
regarded Single European Act. Plummer (2006, pp.437-439) highlighted the long path the EU 
had to walk to the position it nowadays stand as a comparative example for ASEAN. The EU 
needed almost a half century for the realization of the political union. ASEAN could learn 
from this case by tempering the high expectancy level and assess the integration process as 
realistic as possible.           
 Throughout the existing literature, it became clear as well that the role of ASEAN’s 
unique institutional and legal elements is very important in examining the existing integration 
developments. Cockerham (2010, pp.183-184), addresses the significance of the ASEAN Way 
as a contributor to the reluctant stance of the members to delegate enforcement mechanisms to 
ASEAN sub-institutions.         
 Moreover, the path towards the end-goal of introducing the full Community in 2025 is 
getting closer than ever (Chia, 2013, p.34). This means that scientific insights are of 
meaningful value in addressing the hindrances of the process, as it could be potentially 
utilized by ASEAN representatives to accelerate the developments. Academics recognize this 
decreasing time frame and engage in delivering a fitting, scientific contribution to increase the 
amount of literature on this issue area (MacGillivray & Carpenter, 2013, pp.2-3). This 
research follows this trend as well.         
 Viewing the existing literature, there has been a relatively low amount of studies that 
directly apply the concerned theoretical concepts to the case of ASEAN. Most of the literature 
are focusing on the practical side of assessing the integration problems and neglect the many 
theoretical contradictions in explaining the process. These unpredicted factors form the core 
of the slow integration process, which affect the key scientific feature of the general 
theoretical applicability. Therefore, this thesis aims to be a valuable addition to the literature 
12 
 
on how to interpret the theoretical inapplicability and aspires to give recommendations on 
how to overcome the integration hindrances.  
Methodology 
The research design of this thesis consists of a qualitative analysis with the addition of 
descriptive statistics to further elaborate the relevancy of the investigated material. This 
design is relatively flexible and transparent what helps me in investigating the different 
perspectives of the great variety of available sources (Bryman, 2012, pp.304-305). 
Disadvantages are the lack of structure and the time-consuming nature of the design. The 
analysis is going to be done by selecting specific key concepts or assumptions from both or 
one of the theories and apply them to the causal factors of the slow process to test the general 
theoretical applicability. Additional background information about the chosen concepts 
sometimes will be given for a better understanding of their respective mechanics. 
 The theories are to the extent of explaining the driving factors and the role of actors 
contrasting each other, but share the common points of a rational, materialistic-oriented and 
welfare-maximizing integration process (Mattli, 1999, p.20). The discussion about the 
differences or similarities between the theories is not relevant in this analysis since the 
purpose is to study how the contradictions between theory in general and reality are 
constructed.            
 There is a wide range of easily accessible ASEAN-related documents, like 
declarations, policy papers and (analytical) discussions from governmental (ASEAN, national 
governments) or scientific sources. The analytical material exists from a selection of 
(evaluation) documents about the ASEAN-integration developments, governmental 
statements and scientific articles. These are the main sources of data, as ASEAN publishes 
almost all of its documents on its website, which is positive to the replicability and 
verification of this research. The missing sources of data are real-life interviews or 
discussions with the representatives of ASEAN to achieve a more in-depth, personal 
understanding of the integration process. This type could be of significant value to the 
analysis due to ASEAN’s emphasis on informality, but are practically hard to conduct 
(Bryman, 2012, pp.469-471). Another disadvantage is the potential bias in selected 
governmental sources, as governments often depict a more positive situation than actually the 
case, particularly in processes where they have a controlling role (Krol, 2014, pp.109-110). 
Therefore, scientific sources need to be selected as well to maintain the objectivity level. 
Positively, these works are mostly written by independent, academic authors, but sometimes 
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lack the political context in the respective analysis. Moreover, the research consists of a small 
number of news articles to examine the most recent developments, like in the strategic sector. 
This last type of sources is also easily available, but often miss the crucial background 
information about the authors to conduct a verification (Bryman, 2012, pp.113-115). As 
empirical evidence is important to illustrate the actual relevance of certain aspects, the 
research shall also include statistical data from United Nations (UN), ASEAN, Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank databases. It is important to mention that these 
sources have distinct measurement tools. In order to correctly interpret the outcomes, a careful 
examination of the data is necessary. Furthermore, the majority of the sources are written in 
(e-)books, scientific articles or online documents. These sources are reachable on the internet, 
like in academic databases, on websites or in the Leiden University (digital) library. In total, 
one can do an objective assessment of the theoretical inconsistencies to the integration process 
by collecting and analyzing these various sources.      
 The upcoming section is divided into three categories to structure the analysis. The 
categories (economic, institutional and strategic) are selected upon their respective relevancy 
to the theoretical models. The theories have considered all concerned elements in forecasting 
the course of integration, like the economic attributes or the role of relevant actors in shaping 
the process. However, there appeared, especially in these categories, unexpected events that 
stalled the integration process. Hence, it is essential to examine these factors, as they greatly 
contributed to the theoretical inapplicability. Specifically, the following factors are going to 
be addressed in the analytical parts: developmental gaps (economic), institutional 
characteristics (institutional) and conflicting strategic interests (strategic). 
Economic factors 
Firstly, the concept of functional spill-overs needs to be briefly discussed to understand its 
mechanics. A core element of Haas’ theory is the presence of functional spill-overs as a 
modest sign of regional integration (Schmitter, 1969, p.162). Non-state actors push the 
domestic government to engage in more regional integration in the economic-related sections, 
where integration is relative convenient to materialize (Mattli, 1999, p.26). In reality, this is 
often interpreted as measures that intend to lower the conventional trade barriers, like intra-
regional tariffs. This early integration step will gradually direct to related fields and eventually 
to politicized issue areas.          
 The functional spill-overs, as described by Schmitter (1969, pp.162-163), are based on 
the characteristics of a region’s pre-conditions, like existing arrangements and governmental 
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capacities to initiate its self-reinforcing nature. The attributes of these original factors are of 
great significance in expanding the level and scope of the cooperation in the future. The terms 
level and scope refer in this specific context respectively to the members’ participation and 
the width of the policy areas. Governmental capacities, like institutional structures, play an 
essential role in managing future expansions, because it facilitates the needed adjustments of 
integration. If the intend to expand the integration exists, but the supporting state capacities 
are missing, then the operation of the functional spill-overs could be halted (Haas, 1958, 
pp.142-143).            
 In relation to the case of ASEAN, the existing developmental gaps between the 
ASEAN-6 and MCLV hinder the realization of functional spill-overs due to the severe quality 
of the existing capacities, but before jumping into that part, there needs to be more elaboration 
on the gaps themselves. With the accession to ASEAN, these states opened up their 
economies to the global market and unintentionally created within ASEAN wide 
developmental gaps in socio-economic terms (Chia, 2011, p.44). These disparities in the 
dimensions of trade, income and human capital are immense if statistical data is displayed in 
the time frame of a decade (2000-2010): In 2010, in terms of the GDP, the MCLV-states 
produced a total GDP that is fifteen times lower in comparison to that of the other member 
countries and their respective economies (AEC, Chartbook 2011, p.10). In that same year, 
they only contributed ten percent to the total share of GDP in the region. MCLV-states are 
also bottom-ranked (average of $3600) when considering the average income per capita 
adjusted to the purchasing power parity (World Bank, 2017). The medium-low categorization 
of these states in the Human Development Index (cumulative indicator for human 
development, HDI) further underlines their comparatively underdevelopment (UNDP, 2010, 
pp.143-146). The most striking divide is that of the (slightly increasing) income differences 
between MCLV and ASEAN-6 (MacGillivray & Carpenter, 2013, p.31). On the other hand, 
MCLV has witnessed rapid, sometimes even better progression rates than ASEAN-6 in this 
decade. For instance, Laos is one of the best movers in the HDI-rankings with one of the 
world fastest growing education enrollment rates and decreasing percentages of people that 
live below the poverty line of $1.25 per day (UNDP, 2010, p.29). Moreover, the average 
annual growth of the GDP per capita consistently exceeds that of ASEAN-6 in the period of 
2000 till 2010 with Myanmar topping the trend with an average growth of ten percent per 
year, so there is an upwards trend in narrowing the gaps (World Bank, 2017). However, the 
socio-economic circumstances of MCLV are still not at similar tiers to the other countries, 
which have its implications.  
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The impacts of these mentioned gaps for the ASEAN integration process are massive. In the 
light of the agreed goals to reach a competitive, integrated market and a global production 
base, the economic disparities form an impeding factor in the road towards it (MacGillivray & 
Carpenter, 2013, pp.1-3). It affects the operation of the functional spill-overs. Production 
networks (transnational production chains) act as the backbones of the integration of the 
ASEAN-economies (Chia, 2013, pp.7-8). They utilize the cross-border comparative 
advantages, such as the low wages or the abundance of natural resources (Bhattacharyay, 
2009, pp.13-14). These networks could be both inter- as intraregional from nature, depending 
on the type of the production chain. The cross-border networks are integral components in 
realizing a projected increase in the total intra-regional production as the majority of the total 
ASEAN export products are (partly) fabricated in these production networks (Das, 2013, 
p.68). The higher the percentage of integration into the regional networks, the higher the 
(theoretically suggested) chance that related fields follow the same path.   
 Despite ASEAN ambitions to equally upgrade the intra-regional connections, the large 
distinctions in the quality and quantity of the infrastructure between states complicate the 
creation of efficient production networks (MacGillivray & Carpenter, 2013, p.84). As every 
nation has its own infrastructural capacity, not every state has the ability to equally participate 
in the planned activities to create the networks, which negatively influences the operation of 
functional spill-overs. ASEAN needs more amount of time and capital to analyze these 
problems, because the current programs do not sufficiently address it. There needs to be larger 
and more extensive investments to equalize the linkages and to bring the regional connectivity 
to a suitable and trade-efficient level.      
 Moreover, the gaps affect the plans of improving the members’ participation level in 
other sectors. ASEAN tries to raise this level by improving the coordination of the individual 
policies and harmonizing technical regulations (Chia, 2013, pp.13-14). An enhanced 
coordinated region should increase the degree of commitment states have in pursuing the 
collective ASEAN economic interests, because it facilitates intra-regional interactions and 
highlights the benefits of increasing regional economic participation (Plummer & Chia, 2009, 
pp.59-61). The coordination of the logistical sector, an vital area to enhance the intra-regional 
transport, meets significant hindrances due to the fact that MCLV-members lack the basic 
institutional and technical capacities to incorporate the necessary alterations (MacGillivray & 
Carpenter, 2013, pp.100-101). States need to take domestic reforms to adjust the institutional 
and technical circumstances to fit the uniform, regional standards (Nguyen, Nguyen & Hoang, 
2016, pp.121-123). The costs of these alterations are relatively high, especially in the MCLV-
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states where logistics are originally designed to only serve the domestic markets. States are 
reluctant to take the costs, which do not positively contribute to the realization of functional 
spill-overs. Subsequently, it leads to delays to the coordination and harmonization initiatives. 
MCLV-nations are falling more behind the ASEAN-6 where the governments have the needed 
capacities. Therefore, MCLV need more (external) financial and technical assistance to 
execute the domestic changes and to align the policies.    
 Thirdly, there are effects for the amounts of FDI’s in the region. A physically and 
digitally ill-connected environment faces challenges in attracting similar volumes of FDI’s 
like the better-integrated ones, because investors recognize the potential risks, like gaining 
smaller returns of investments in such states (Bhattacharyay, 2009, p.3). MCLV-states only 
receive 20% of the total value of inward-coming FDI’s in the region between 2013 until 2015 
(AEC, Chartbook, 2016, pp.12-14). This number is comparatively low to the other member 
states while financial investments are crucial to MCLV in overcoming the development issues. 
There is a sensible chance that the numbers of FDI-inflows could decrease over time when 
developmental gaps are still not tackled (Plummer & Chia, 2009, pp.88-90). This could lead 
to more severe consequences to the integration plans as FDI’s have always been very critical 
in stimulating the development and economic projects in ASEAN (Athukorala & Menon, 
1997, pp.165-167). It still fulfills a substantial role considering the existing need for 
investments to close the gaps. The operation of the functional spill-overs could even be 
further diminished when ASEAN receive lesser amounts of FDI.    
 It is clear that the large socio-economic divides affect various aspects of integration 
and that it has its consequences for the realization of functional spill-over effects. If ASEAN 
states increase efforts to improve these conditions, the functional spill-over effects will 
materialize. The next subsection comprises the cross-border infrastructure (CBI)  initiative to 
evidence the significance of improving the quality of governmental capacities.   
 ASEAN already incorporated actions to overcome the developmental gaps into the 
transnational economic programs (MacGillivray & Carpenter, 2013, pp.9-10). These activities 
have made significant steps in upgrading the local circumstances so integration can flourish. 
This could be exemplified by the CBI-program around the Mekong river which aims to 
increase the size and speed of the trade between MCLV, Thailand, and the Chinese provinces 
of Yunnan and Guanxi by constructing infrastructural projects (Bhattacharyay, 2009, p.9). The 
first activities were high-priority projects in the region where the aim was to make the 
infrastructure usable and easier expandable to a wider range of areas, such as transport and 
agriculture (ADB, 2016). This multidimensional-thought program is ideal to let the effects of 
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the functional spill-over materialize. Viewing the outcomes of the program, it has delivered a 
compelling infrastructural foundation where different economic sectors have been connected 
since the start of the CBI and which are expandable in the near future.    
 Briefly summarized, the existing regional divides play a significant role in the failed 
realization of functional spill-overs in the region. The severity of intra-ASEAN disparities 
greatly affects the integration developments. Some member states lack the crucial capacities 
to initiate the functional spill-overs and equally participate in the integration procedure. These 
large disparities were not taken into consideration by neofunctionalism. An improvement of 
the existing circumstances through more investments is required to minor the developmental 
gaps and materialize the functional spill-overs.  
Institutional factors 
Starting off, the role of norms and values in the theories needs to be succinctly discussed. 
Both neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism are materialistic-oriented theoretical 
paradigms and emphasize the stimulating effects of mutual economic benefits in the 
integration procedure (Cockerham, 2010, pp.166-167). They do not pay much attention to the 
meanings of informal norms and values, because they are based on the EU-case where the 
binding character of the agreements and built-in legal enforcement mechanisms act as 
foundations in the style of operation (Jetschke, & Rüland, 2009, p.199).    
 This differs to ASEAN where states greatly comply with norms and values 
(Katsumata, 2003, pp.116-118). In light of the various threats during the Cold War, the head 
of states explicitly stress the inclusion of rules, like the mutual respect for the national 
sovereignty in the organizational design of the then yet-built regional organization 
(Katsumata, 2003, pp.111-113). These strict set of principles were informally incorporated 
into the ASEAN Way. Strikingly, there was an absence of a severe, military conflict between 
the nations in the 50-year-old existence of ASEAN (Jetschke and Rüland, 2009, p.192). This 
indicates a great sense of adherence to (parts) of the principles of the ASEAN Way. 
 However, besides the positive implications, there are also negative consequences of 
the great respect for these normative principles. Elements, like the non-interference, create 
space to evade unfavorable arrangements by modifying the interpretation and implementation 
of the contents of the accords (Yoshimatsu, 2006, p.117). In such situations, states tend to 
pursue the self-interest and not the collective ones. For instance, ASEAN members are 
relatively reluctant at abolishing non-tariff barriers (NTBs). These barriers form the majority 
of the existing trade barriers in the region (Pelkmans, 2016, pp.131-133). NTBs, like quality 
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requirements, raise the transaction costs (transaction–related expenditures) between trade 
partners and undermine the trade flow of production factors, which contradict the ambition to 
achieve a free mobility of those factors. A NTB is more complicated to prohibit due to the 
contested nature of its meaning: there is no universally agreed legal definition on the 
categorization of NTBs (Das, Menon, Severino & Lal Shrestha, 2013, pp.34-35). Member 
states unilaterally determine the definition of a NTB. Consequently, some ASEAN states 
interpret NTBs not as protectionist instruments, but rather as essential measures to operate 
vital domestic markets and therefore abstain from removing them. The ability to discern 
interpretations eventually leads to delays in the implementation of the necessary reforms, so 
there needs to be tighter regulations on how to adapt the ASEAN Way.   
 Secondly, the competences of the ASEAN Secretariat contribute to the speed of the 
integration developments. As discussed earlier, ASEAN is not an organization where national 
states have delegated enforcing powers to one of its organs, like the EU (Cockerham, 2010, 
p.168). This is reflected by the relatively limited scope of mandates of the Jakarta-based 
Secretariat (ASEAN Secretariat, 1992). Besides operating the daily activities of managing 
committees, other important mandates are the coordinating and monitoring of policies. A legal 
framework is a missing function. The Secretariat has no legal powers to enforce actions 
against states that do not comply with the contents of the various agreements (Chia, 2013, p. 
28). This solely facilitating role was not such an issue in previous integration steps whereby 
the calls for domestic adjustments were lower. In realizing a fully active AEC, the 
contemporary form of the Secretariat is insufficient to accommodate the AEC-targets. This 
can be illustrated by viewing the ADB Scorecard (ADB-monitoring tool of the 
implementation of ASEAN-plans) on the rate of implementation of the first Blueprint-
stipulated actions (Chia, 2013, pp.29-30). There is a lack of progress in the liberalization of 
services (54%) and investments (50%) until 2013. The progress could be effectively 
stimulated when the Secretariat is mandated to control the developments (Das, 2013, pp.49-
50). The Secretariat needs more mechanisms to stimulate the governments to realize the 
agreed actions.          
 From a theoretical perspective, the existing limited scope of the Secretariat contrasts 
the emergence of corresponding elements according to the level and scope of the integration 
advancements (Kim, 2014, pp.388-389). When the ‘window of opportunity’ arises to go to the 
next step of the integration process, governments get pressured to delegate more of its 
sovereign powers to the regional organization for the sake of integration, like what happened 
in Europe (Hew, 2005, p.15). Neofunctionalism emphasizes the role of the non-state actors as 
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the main drivers and liberal intergovernmentalists state the instrumental use of the regional 
organization as factor for the transfer of competences. According to former ASEAN 
Secretary-General Surin Putsiwan, ASEAN member states need to empower the Secretariat 
with more mandates to realize the AEC-goals (Chongkittavorn, 2012).  
 Thirdly, the form of the decision-making procedure and the equal position of the 
member states also affect the rate of integration. As earlier stated, ASEAN operates via a 
consensus-seeking procedure (Bridges, 2004, p.393). The process is based on the Indonesian 
village-originated concepts of musyawarah and mufakat, which respectively represent the 
consultative and unanimous nature of the talks (Thambipillai & Saravanamuttu, 1985, pp.12-
13). The procedure forces representatives to only take decisions when all of the members have 
agreed upon the concerned points (Thambipillai & Saravanamuttu, 1985, pp.6-8). This opens 
up the opportunity to have very long and sluggish discussion rounds depending on the topics’ 
politicization levels. The more controversial a topic is to discuss, the longer the duration of 
the talks and the less likely the chance of meeting consensus (Thambipillai & Saravanamuttu, 
1985, pp.13-14). Hence, it is undeniable that due to an impasse in the interstate negotiations, 
the regional organization misses decisions that further stimulate the integration process. This 
can be illustrated by the lack of introducing comprehensive monitoring systems (Chia, 2013, 
pp.31-33).           
 In addition, every nation has an equal position during the negotiations. The emphasis 
on the fair bargaining position has been formulated a long time ago, since the inception of 
ASEAN to provide stability in the region (MacGillivray & Carpenter, 2013, pp.3-4. 
Throughout the years, this principle has not been changed much, even with the MCLV-
enlargement what can be evidenced by the absence of specific advantages for particular 
nations (Rattanasevee, 2014, p.118).        
 These two elements are contradictory to liberal intergovernmentalism. The theory 
suggests a difference in bargaining position of states based on the social, economic and 
political factors of the individual nations (Moravcsik, 1993, pp.484-486). These differences 
impact the course of the decision-making procedure, as the more influential states pressure the 
smaller ones to comply with their plans (Bridges, 2004, pp.393-395). ASEAN does not have 
‘initiators’ that take the lead in directing the process of integration (Rattanasevee, 2014, 
pp.124-125). The members respect ASEAN’s egalitarian notions and refuse to present 
themselves above the others in the fear that it could lead to an interstate, leadership-seeking 
power struggle that could deteriorate the integration developments (Mattli, 1999, p.14) 
Indonesia, as most populous and economically significant state, have manifested itself only as 
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the diplomatic representative of ASEAN in forums, as the G20 and is likely to hold that status 
(Rattanasevee, 2014, p.120). ASEAN needs to differentiate the decision-making procedure 
based on the relative importance of the issues.        
 To sum up, the distinct institutional circumstances play a very significant role in the 
theoretical inapplicability of both theories. ASEAN is based upon entirely different 
institutional foundations than the EU, like the adherence to informal norms. Consequently, it 
leads to an alternative style of operation, which largely contributed to the sluggish integration 
procedure. Adjustments are needed to the institutional mechanics in order to improve the flow 
of the integration process.  
Strategic factors 
This part focuses on the consequences of the strategic interests for the integration process. As 
argued by Moravcsik (1993, pp.483-485), liberal intergovernmentalism state the obtainment 
of greater benefits from integration as the main motive why states want to engage in regional 
integration. A regional organization could accommodate to the various individual demands of 
the member states by, for instance, delivering a facilitating function. Furthermore, the theory 
suggests interdependence as notable factor in the rational calculus, as markets, production 
chains and whole economies are ever-getting interconnected during the process of integration 
(Moravcsik, 1993, p.486). Even though ASEAN has contributed to the intra-regional 
connectivity and stability, many ASEAN member states do not perceive the progress in the 
regional integration as part of its core strategic interests what partly explains the sluggish 
integration process. Strategic interests are defined as follows in this section: the vital, long-
term interests for the survival of state (Tsuruoka, 2011, pp.96-98).     
 As stated in the first Blueprint (2007, p.5), one particular AEC-objective is the aim to 
create a globally connected region. This point relates to the outward-looking economic policy 
whereby there is an explicit focus on attracting extra-regional arrangements to boost the 
international economic position of ASEAN. This specific target stimulates the existing 
massive economic traffic between ASEAN and external partners that accounts to 80 % of the 
total trade flow in the region and to $120 million worth of FDI's in 2015 (ASEAN Economic 
Chartbook 2016, pp.15-20). Meanwhile, intra-ASEAN trade constitutes, despite its rising 
trend, only to the remaining, small part, which symbolizes the comparatively low levels of 
regional interdependence. This policy underappreciates the intra-regional economic relations 
what conflicts the other AEC-ambitions of higher regional connectivity (MacGillivray & 
Carpenter, 2013, pp.1-3).          
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 Member states incorporate the small regional significance to their foreign policies. 
Consequently, many nations do not consider the intra-ASEAN economic stream and 
corresponding integration initiatives as a component of the strategic interests (Kim, 2014, 
p.384). This is exemplified by viewing recent (2010-2015) foreign policy trends. Some of 
these policies directly threaten the AEC-integration initiatives: Under the administration of the 
in 2014-elected Indonesian president, Joko Widodo, Indonesia moves away from its position 
as active participant in multilateral institutions, favoring bilateralism instead to better pursue 
the strategic interests (Poole, 2015). The foreign policy does not regard ASEAN as an 
institution that fits into the strategic plans of Indonesia in becoming ‘a global maritime 
fulcrum’.           
 Geopolitical games contribute to the marginalization of the ASEAN integration 
progress as well (Ba, 2014, pp.155-157). ASEAN increasingly acts as the arena for 
geopolitical battles due to the strategic locations of trade routes and the abundance of 
resources (Egberink & Van der Putten, 2011, pp.2-3). Emerging and contemporary powers, 
like China and the United States, have recently shift their focus to ASEAN in order to expand 
their influence in the region. China emerged as one of ASEAN’s leading trade and investment 
partners since the beginning of the 21st century (Ba, 2014, pp.149-151). The ASEAN-China 
relationships constitute from both multilateral and bilateral arrangements (Chan, 2015, p.76). 
The bilateral relations has gained more emphasis in the as assertive-labeled foreign policy 
under president Xi Jinping (Zhang, 2014, pp.77-78). In regards of resolving regional issues, 
like the South China Sea territorial dispute, he insisted a ‘pragmatic and flexible’ (bilateral) 
approach. This approach obstructs ASEAN’s intention to enhance the collective mindset, as it 
creates political divide between ASEAN states.     
 Moreover, the Americans have introduced the ‘Pivot to Asia’ foreign policy during the 
rule of Obama as a ‘rebalancing reaction’ to China’s actions (International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 2012). As the US hegemonic role is being challenged, the new policy 
intends to improve the US-ASEAN military and economic relations in the region by 
promising greater US engagement to protect the collective interests of ASEAN. The greater 
commitment is exemplified by the active US involvement in the intergovernmental East Asia 
Summit (military dialogue).          
 This power battle between the US and China affects the collective ASEAN mindset 
and undermines the ambition to create more unity in the region, because members are aware 
of the potential (beneficial or negative) implications for their self-interest when taking 
concrete standpoints on regional issues (Lim, 2016). This point is evidenced by the struggle of 
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ASEAN in making unanimous statements on several of these regional issues, for instance in 
the territorial dispute with China (Daily Mail, 2016). ASEAN has not reached consensus yet 
on formulating an official reaction to the increased Chinese provocation in the region’s sea, 
despite its clear threats to the region’s territorial integrity. The drive to comply with the 
common ASEAN interest is getting weaker while pursuing the self-interests are increasingly 
profitable, especially when powerful nations offer lucrative arrangements in exchange for 
political support (Ba, 2014, pp.155-157). An example of this point is the backing of China by 
Cambodia in international discussions about the South China Sea disputes (The American 
Interest, 2016). The cost/benefit calculation of pursuing the common ASEAN interests is not 
constantly in favor of cooperation anymore. Therefore, more measures are necessary to 
promote the common ASEAN interests and to limit the external influences. Singaporean 
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong stated that the (absence of an) collective reaction to cross-
border obstacles can define the future of the ASEAN Community: Fragmentation or 
integration? (Hussain, 2016).          
 Relating back to the assumptions of Moravcsiks theory, there is a sensible degree of 
overlap with the real-life developments in the form of the rational state calculus (Cockerham, 
2010, pp.168-169). As described, states conduct a rational analysis on every decision they 
take. These aspects can explain some of the discussed developments, like the emphasis on 
external relations. However, the last point in Moravcsiks model (institutional design) does not 
match with the unexpected deprioritization of ASEAN-integration (Moravcsik, 1993, pp.483-
485). This particular phase depends on the previous interstate negotiations, which in the case 
of ASEAN initially signaled a great desire and commitment in achieving the integration 
objectives. States recognized the many mutual benefits of integration and subsequently took 
noticeable efforts to advance integration. They have invested a lot of time and capital in 
attempting to formalize the institutional design of the AEC (Chia, 2013, pp.28-30). This 
should, theoretically based upon the existing elements, result to an as planned, participative 
process, but a theoretically unexpected change in the calculation of these elements during the 
integration time frame has caused depriortization of the integration progress and relatively 
low participation levels.         
 To conclude, ASEAN members have conflicting strategic interests. Many states do not 
consider ASEAN integration as part of their core strategic interests anymore in the time frame 
of the integration process and instead focus on extra-regional (trade) relations. Furthermore, 
powerful external actors exert significant influence on the individual nations to alter the 
collective mindset. These two points have contributed to the stalling integration process and 
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have not been suggested by the theoretical models.      
 Viewing the analyzed material, it is very interesting to notice that the unique regional 
circumstances are constantly relevant in all three dimensions. It depends per category how the 
effects are constructed. For instance, the strategic factors rely comparatively much on external 
attributes, which mean that foreign actors greatly shape these attributes in comparison to the 
other categories. Nevertheless, these distinct regional characteristics play an essential role in 
the inapplicability of the theories. Another striking point is the difference in levels of severity. 
Some issues are more influential or are easier to overcome than other ones, like the 
developmental gaps-oriented issues. These latter issues require the easier-feasible solution of 
greater financial support whereas the other problems necessitate more complicated political or 
institutional reforms.  
Conclusion  
All in all, the research has investigated the elements that are critical to the applicability of the 
theoretical models as analytical tools. In the light of gaining more understanding about the 
contradictions and how to overcome the integration problems, various significant 
inconsistences in three dimensions have been analyzed: In economic terms, the developmental 
gaps affect the emergence and self-reinforcing strength of a core neofunctionalist concept of 
functional spill-overs. This aspect implies the existence of large economic distinctions 
between European and ASEAN integration. Institutionally, the insignificant roles for norms 
and values in both the theories are not in line with the great adherence to the principles of the 
ASEAN Way. In addition, the existing limited scope of the Secretariat contradicts the 
suggested increased institutional scope during integration advancement. Furthermore, the 
consensus-based decision-making style and equal negotiation position of all members are also 
not operating in accordance to the liberal intergovernmentalist assumption of distinct 
bargaining positions. These points contributed to the slowdown of the rate of integration and 
gave evidence to the, by various scholars mentioned, assumption that the great socio-political 
divides between ASEAN and the EU act as factors to the theoretical inconsistencies. Strategic 
elements, like the external-oriented focus and geopolitical games have forced ASEAN states 
to recalculate the status of ASEAN-integration to a non-strategically important level what 
contrasted their previous large efforts in designing the institution, as suggested by Moravcsiks 
model. This point implies a stronger pursuit of self-interests than suggested by liberal 
intergovernmentalism.          
 Based on these findings, the answer to the research question is that the region’s 
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distinct social, institutional, economic and political circumstances explain the theoretically 
unpredicted slow integration process. These elements differ too much to the European-based 
characteristics of the theories to correctly predict the ASEAN integration procedure. 
Reflecting back to the academic literature, this explanation has been suggested by the 
majority of the academic scholars what indicates a great degree of confirmation to the 
literature. However, it is not so clear how the case of the EU should act as learning lessons, 
like suggested by Capannelli & Filippini. The ASEAN integration process is based on the 
globally-connected economic attributes, which is very different to the 20th century, European-
based circumstances. The domestic and regional notions cannot sufficiently explain the 
progress of integration in the ever-globalizing world system. To a greater dimension, this 
thesis has raised awareness about the limited scope of the two theories in relation to cases 
where the discussed characteristics are very different. To extend the theoretical applicability, a 
careful examination of the actual relevance of the concerned concepts is needed, like by 
incorporating the influence of extra-regional players in the integration process.   
 Furthermore, this study highlighted the implications of the various hindrances to the 
integration procedure. The thesis has delivered insights on how to interpret and tackle the 
problems. The given recommendations, like the call for more investments to narrow the 
existing gaps, contribute to the practical (scientific) material on how to overcome the 
obstacles.          
 Despite attempting to conduct an optimal academic research, there are always 
limitations. The focus on the inconsistencies between reality and rhetoric in this research 
potentially underappreciates the positive theoretical commonalities in the ASEAN integration 
process, such as the gradual nature (neofunctionalism) and the dominating voice for state 
actors (liberal intergovernmentalism). These overlaps display the (partly) persistent theoretical 
relevance, which needs to be addressed as well when extending the theoretical applicability. 
In addition, the great level of informality of the negotiations put restrictions on the collection 
of objective data. ASEAN only bring reports on the contents of the talks afterwards, which 
may differ from the actual negotiations. The best possible manner to examine the concise 
opinions of the representatives is by managing a direct (informal) conversation, which is 
practically difficult to realize. Lastly, this thesis only investigated a limited number of 
categories despite the existence of other contributing categories, like the social one. More 
extensive research is needed in order to achieve a complete analysis with incorporation of 
these factors.  
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